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Abstract. This paper mainly discusses how governments make decisions by us-
ing reference groups in the development of open data. Hypotheses are proposed 
based on prospect theory and institutional theory, and data collection and hypoth-
esis verification are conducted based on previous research models. It is concluded 
that municipal governments tend to take the principle "doctrine of the mean" to 
direct the development of OGD platforms when facing the trait-based reference 
group, while it will take the radical route when facing the institution-based refer-
ence group. The two reference groups play different regulatory roles, prompting 
the government to dynamically adjust the development direction of OGD. 
Keywords: Public Information System, Peer Influence, Open Government 
Data, Reference Group. 
1 Introduction 
Decisions on organizational information system development not always depend on the 
free will of the decision-making organization, but also greatly influenced by institu-
tional environment [1-4]. Although studies have found that organizations in public sec-
tors often succumb to the influence of institutions when developing public information 
systems [5-6], these studies have not fully explored the dynamics of organizations ad-
justing their information system development according to the institutional environ-
ment.  
Open data has attracted more and more attention from the government and the pub-
lic. In China, Shanghai took the lead in practice of OGD (Open Government Data) 
development in 2012. Up to the first half of 2019, 82 provincial, deputy provincial and 
prefecture-level OGD platforms have been online [7]. 
This research mainly investigates how reference groups affect the development of 
OGD platforms. On the basis of these studies and according to the model proposed by 
Du K and Dai Y [8], this study tries to clarify the direction of the development of OGD 
platforms influenced by peers. By revealing the complex dynamics of peer influence, 
this research helps enrich the study of institutional environment and information system 
development, meanwhile provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for the 
reform of administrative information systems in the era of big data. It also highlights 
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the unique background of administrative organizations in China and helps to summarize 
the Chinese experience of policy diffusion theory. 
2 Theory and Hypothesis 
2.1 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory describes a decision model of game players under uncertain conditions. 
It proposes that decision-making depends on reference: decision-makers derive utility 
from “gains” and “losses” measured relative to a reference point [9]. 
In order to prevent superstitious learning, a rational organization tends to use organ-
izations sharing common or comparable traits as their learning targets [10-11], so as to 
form a trait-based reference group. It could therefore be argued that the municipal gov-
ernments would resort to reference groups and take the average development level of 
them as a reference point. The candidates for the reference group are comparable gov-
ernments with common characteristics associated with open data development. When 
a city considers itself behind its reference point, it will try to catch up in the next period 
by speeding up the development of OGD. Otherwise, it tends to avoid risk by slowing 
or even blocking its subsequent development of OGD. Generally speaking, the devel-
opment of open data of a municipal government will step forward to the average level 
of its trait-based reference group. To sum up, the hypothesis is: 
H1: A municipality government will adjust its development level of OGD platforms 
to the average level of comparable governments with common traits. The more the gov-
ernment deviates from the average in the previous period, the more it will adjust in the 
next period. 
2.2 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory [12] believes that organizations not only operate in a specific tech-
nical environment, but also develop in a specific institutional environment. The adop-
tion of information technology by organizations is not entirely technology-driven but 
largely stimulated by external environmental pressures [3, 6]. Since the provincial gov-
ernment has the legislative and executive power to evaluate the performance of munic-
ipal governments, the development level of OGD can also be used as one of the perfor-
mance evaluation indicators. Therefore, the pursuit of legitimacy will prompt municipal 
governments to maintain OGD development at the average level of their institution-
based reference groups [8]. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: A municipal government will adjust its development level of OGD platforms to 
the average level of peer municipal governments in the same province. The more the 
government deviates from the average in the previous period, the more it will adjust in 
the next period. 
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2.3 Moderating Effects of Superordinate Organizations 
Moderating Effects on Trait-based Reference Groups. The development level of 
OGD often reflects the degree to which the institutional and administrative infrastruc-
ture of a government are favorable towards OGD development [13]. Provincial govern-
ments with mature infrastructure can compensate for the limitations of trait-based ref-
erence groups. Therefore, it can be concluded that provincial governments with more 
developed OGD platforms can reduce the direct use of trait-based reference groups for 
decision-making by municipal governments. The hypothesis is: 
H3a: The development level of OGD platforms of superordinate governments damp-
ens the influence of trait-based reference groups on focal governments. 
Moderating Effects on Institution-based Reference Groups. If a provincial govern-
ment achieves a high development level of OGD, its subordinate municipal govern-
ments will interpret it as a signal that the higher authorities attach special importance 
to OGD among the many potential legitimizing factors. This consideration will lead the 
municipal governments to pay more attention to institution-based reference groups to 
ensure that they do not lag behind groups. In contrast, municipal governments will fo-
cus more on their traits and reduces their tendency to closely monitor their institution-
based reference groups [8]. Based on the arguments above, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H3b: The development level of OGD platforms of superordinate governments en-
hances the influence of institution-based reference groups on focal governments. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Research Data 
The data of OGD platforms that the research uses comes from "China Open Data In-
dex", produced by Fudan University and released in May 2017 for the first time. This 
research mainly evaluates the OGD platforms of prefecture-level municipal govern-
ments over a period of five half years, from the first half of 2017 to the first half of 
2019. The final sample includes 235 observations from 47 cities. Due to the increase 
and decrease of OGD platforms in different periods of time, as well as the merging of 
cities, an unbalanced panel data set was formed. The scores in the index were standard-
ized to measure the development level of open data of municipal governments and used 
for statistical analysis. 
3.2 Measurement 
Moderating Effects on Trait-based Reference Groups. Trait-based reference groups 
were constructed based on two traits: population size and fiscal revenue. For each city 
in the sample, a trait-based reference group was constructed by searching for other cities 
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whose population and income are in the range of 80-120% of the focus city in the same 
period. Cities in the same province were excluded. In our dataset, the number of peers 
ranges from 1 to 3.  
For the institution-based reference groups, all prefecture-level municipal govern-
ments established OGD platforms in the same province were included in the reference 
groups. In the dataset, the number of same-province peers ranges from 1 to 17.  
Control Variables. The control variables are basically consistent with the models of 
Du K and Dai Y [8], including population size, number of higher education institutions, 
average wage and GDP per capita, government fiscal revenue, annual development gap, 
standard deviation of reference groups and year fixed effects. The data of population 
size, average wage and GDP per capita, and government fiscal revenue were obtained 
from CEIC economic database, and the statistics of higher education institutions were 
obtained from the list of higher education institutions released by the Ministry of Edu-
cation of the People's Republic of China. The rest of the data were obtained by calcu-
lation. Incomplete parts of the CEIC database were also supplemented through various 
channels such as government bulletins. 
Model Interpretation. To verify the hypothesis, the final form of e-government devel-
opment model proposed by Du K and Dai Y[8] is referred to in this study: 
eGovAdjustmenti,t+1=β0+β1TRGDeviationi,t+β2IRGDeviationi,t+β3PreGovi,t+β4Pre-
Govi,t*TRGDeviationi,t+β5PreGovi,t*IRGDeviationi,t+Controls+Yeart+εi,t (1) 
Where eGovAdjustmenti,t+1 represents the adjustment degree of OGD made by the mu-
nicipal government in the t+1 period. TRGDeviationi,t represents the degree of deviation 
of the municipal government from the average development level of OGD of its trait-
based reference group in the t period. IRGDeviationi,t represents the degree of deviation 
of the municipal government from the average development level of OGD of its insti-
tution-based reference group in the t period. PreGovi,t is the open data score of the pro-
vincial government. Controls stands for control variables and coefficients. Yeart repre-
sents year fixed effects, and εi,t is the residual. 
4 Results and Discussion 
Eviews 10 was used to estimate the model, and time fixed effect was applied to the 
panel data. Table 1 and 2 respectively present the results of descriptive statistics and 
Pearson correlation coefficient, and table 3 presents the results of model estimation. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Standard Deviation N* 
TRG -.022 .685 158 
IRG .094 .919 158 
PRE .763 .778 132 
DG -.606 .976 149 
DTRG .545 .615 162 
DIRG .788 .479 173 
GDPC 89.332 44.7 235 
HE .882 .536 235 
REV 10.496 .465 235 
AW 6.692 .311 234 
POP 6.692 .311 235 
Note: DG: development gap; DTRG: standard deviation of trait-based group; DIRG: 
standard deviation of institution-based group; GDPC: GDP per capita (in thousands); 
POP: population size (log-transformed); AW: average wage (in thousands); REV: gov-
ernment fiscal revenue (log-transformed); HE: number of institutions of higher educa-
tion (log-transformed). 
* The increase and decrease of OGD platforms in different periods of time, as well as 
the merging of cities leading to a discrepancy in the total number of items. 
Table 2. Pairwise Pearson Correlation Coefficients.  
 TRG IRG PRE DG DTRG DIRG GDPC HE REV AW 
PO
P 
TRG 1           
IRG .707** 1          
PRE .157 .206 1         
DG .567** .180 .688** 1        
DTR
G 
.128 .334** .246* 
-
.702** 
1       
DIRG -.022 -.134 .056 -.045 .105 1      
GDPC .252* .387** .048 -.008 .290** .005 1     
HE .431** .688** .102 .138 .150 -.190 .356** 1    
REV .285** .652** .182 -.007 .266* -.268* .666** .676** 1   
AW .037 -.014 .066 .052 -.019 -.230* .083 .082 .245* 1  
POP .133 .406** .139 .068 .012 -.363** .099 .545** .738** .380** 1 
Note: **: p <.01 (two-tailed t-test); *: p <.05 (two-tailed t-test). 
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Table 3. Model Estimation Results 
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
TRG -0.176 2.305 0.028 
IRG 0.777 4.648 0.000 
PRE 0.093 0.567 0.573 
PRE*TRG 0.221 7.870 0.000 
PRE*IRG -0.432 -3.174 0.002 
DG 0.056 0.256 0.799 
DTRG 0.028 0.092 0.927 
DIRG 0.307 0.665 0.508 
GDPC 0.0003 0.112 0.911 
HE -0.235 -1.178 0.243 
REV -0.176 -0.306 0.760 
AW 0.114 0.552 0.583 
POP 0.161 0.265 0.792 
Fixed Effects (Period)   
2017S1--C 0.126   
2017S2--C -0.551   
2018S1--C -0.028   
2018S2--C -0.083   
2019S1--C 0.085   
 
H1 is supported by the data in table 3. The coefficient of TRGDeviation β1 is -0.176 
(Prob. < 0.05). This suggests that, when the development level of a municipality gov-
ernment is above average (TRGDeviation > 0), its OGD development will slow down 
in the later period (β1 * TRGDeviation < 0). Conversely, if the development level of a 
municipality government is lower than the average (TRGDeviation < 0), its OGD de-
velopment will be faster in the following period (β1 * TRGDeviation> 0). The bigger 
the deviation, the more adjustment there will be in the next period. Moreover, the ab-
solute value of β1 is less than 1, which indicates that there is partial adjustment, the 
government will make adjustments according to the average of trait-based reference 
groups, but not completely adjust or overreact. 
H2 is not supported by the data. H2 assumes that municipality governments will 
adjust their development level of OGD platforms to the average level of peer municipal 
governments in the same province. But the estimated coefficients of IRGDeviation β2 
is 0.777 > 0 (Prob. < 0.01). This indicates that the development level of OGD platforms 
will not be adjusted to the average level of institution-based reference groups. So Hy-
pothesis 2 is rejected. 
The rejection of H2 may be related to the early development stage of OGD platforms 
in China. The number of provincial OGD platforms is small, and municipal OGD plat-
forms are scattered. As a result, when some municipality governments want to select 
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peers in the same province as their counterparts, they may find that there are few refer-
ences. However, the rejection of H2 does not mean that the development of OGD plat-
forms is not influenced by institution-based reference groups, but indicates that the ad-
justment moves towards a more extreme direction. Under the peer pressure from insti-
tution-based reference groups, municipality governments will adopt more aggressive 
policies on OGD development. 
H3a and H3b are both supported by the data above. The interaction between PreGov 
and TRGDeviation is positive and significant (β4  = 0.221, Prob. < 0.01), indicating that 
if the provincial OGD development get a relatively high score, the municipal govern-
ments in this province will do less adjustment on their OGD development to the average 
level of trait-based reference groups. Moreover, interaction between PreGov IRGDevi-
ation is negative and significant (β5 = -0.432, Prob. < 0.01), indicating that if the pro-
vincial OGD development get a relatively high score, the municipal government will 
adjust to not so extreme, but to a slightly more moderate direction. That is to say, the 
municipal government will adjust its OGD development towards the average level of 
the institution-based reference group.  
5 Conclusion 
This study discusses the influence of reference group on the development of OGD plat-
forms of Chinese municipal governments. The conclusion is that, municipal govern-
ments position the development of OGD platforms near the average level of the trait-
based reference group. If the development of OGD platform of a municipal government 
falls behind the average of its trait-based reference group, it will try to catch up in the 
following period; If it exceeds the average of its trait-based reference group, it will slow 
down the development. When it comes to the institution-based reference group, the 
adjustment becomes radical. That is, the government will take the principle "doctrine 
of the mean" to direct the development of OGD platforms when facing the trait-based 
reference group, while it will take the radical route when facing the institution-based 
reference group. The two reference groups have different regulating effects on the de-
velopment of OGD platforms. 
The significance of this study is to reveal the direction of peer influence on the de-
velopment of public information systems. Prospect theory well explained the OGD de-
velopment in China while the institutional theory did not. In the absence of a perfect 
standard, the public sectors adjust the development of public information system mainly 
based on the trait-based reference group. According to the conclusion, "best practice" 
selection of OGD shall be conducted by provincial governments, and the assessment 
results shall be included in the evaluation of performance assessment of municipal gov-
ernments, so as to improve the diffusion scale of OGD and prevent aggressive adjust-
ments. In future practice, the institutional environment also needs to be optimized 
through top-level design. 
The limitation of the study is that the development of OGD in China is still in the 
initial stage. The available data is not that much, which to some extent affects the ac-
curacy of the results. In the future, the research can be re-investigated years after to 
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make it more convincing. Transnational studies can also be conducted to compare the 
development of OGD in different countries and examine the moderating effect of dif-
ferent cultural dimensions on the influence of reference groups. 
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